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Abstract
This thesis consists of three papers unified by a common focus on the behavior of
voters and politicians in elections.
Chapter 1 considers informal voting in Australian elections. In Australia, there are around5-
6% of voters who submit an informal vote, which doesn’t count towards the total. In this
chapter, I make use of a natural experiment, based on exogenous changes in electorate bound-
aries, to identify what factors influence the number of informal votes. I find that factors that
feature in the traditional theory on voter decisions, competitiveness and number of other vot-
ers, do not affect the rate of informal voting. Instead I find that more candidates on the ballot
results in higher levels of informal voting. Halving the number of options would reduce in-
formal voting by 27%. This effect is present regardless of the level of education, indicating it is
likely a decision to abstain rather than an error.
Chapter 2, deals with the role of politicians’ personal ideology in determining their voting
behaviour. I extend recent empirical findings by applying a text-as-data approach to analyse
speeches in parliament following a recent politically charged moment in Australia –- a na-
tional survey on same sex marriage (SSM). I estimate opposition to SSM in parliamentary
speeches and measure how speech changed following the SSM vote. I find that Opposers of
SSM became stronger in their opposition once the results of the national survey were released,
v
regardless of how their electorate voted. No consistent and statistically significant change is
seen in the behavior of Supporters of SSM. This result indicates that personal ideology played
a more significant role in determining changes in speech than did the position of the elec-
torate.
In Chapter 3, I analyze the transition to instant run-off voting (IRV) that is occurring in some
jurisdictions in the U.S. There are mixed findings in the literature on the benefits of IRV for
voters and politicians, making informed debate around its adoption challenging. Analysis of
the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metro Area, which has strong natural experiment characteristics,
indicates that the introduction of IRV caused a 9.6 percentage point increase in turnout for
Mayoral elections. The effect is larger for precincts that have higher poverty rates. Text based
sentiment analysis of mayoral debates across the U.S., a new approach in this area, indicates
that the introduction of IRV improved the civility of debates with candidates substituting
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